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The	Research	Domain	Criteria	(RDoC)	–	a	new	dawn	for	neurodiversity	research?			Will	Mandy		It	is	75	years	since	Donald	Triplett	became	the	first	person	to	be	diagnosed	with	autism.	Since	then,	‘autism	spectrum	disorder’	(hereafter	‘autism’)	has	come	to	be	considered	a	common	condition,	with	an	estimated	prevalence	above	one	per	cent	(Centres	for	Disease	Control,	2014),	and	an	ever-growing	prominence	in	the	public	consciousness.	Nevertheless,	its	value	as	a	diagnosis	continues	to	be	contested	(e.g.,	Gillberg,	2010;	Foss-Feig	et	al,	2016).	In	this	editorial,	I	outline	some	critiques	of	autism	as	a	diagnostic	category,	and	point	towards	a	recent	development	in	mental	health	science	as	a	potential	remedy	for	these.			By	convention,	a	psychiatric	diagnosis	is	judged	according	to	three	criteria.	First,	it	should	be	reliable,	meaning	that	it	can	be	applied	consistently	by	different	diagnosticians	in	different	settings	(e.g.,	Spitzer,	1978).	Second,	it	should	have	
clinical	utility,	such	that	it	communicates	useful	information	about	the	characteristics,	needs	and	future	prospects	of	a	diagnosed	person	(Jablensky,	2016).	The	third	criterion,	that	of	validity,	is	epistemologically	contentious	and	harder	to	define.	In	its	broadest	sense,	the	validity	of	a	concept	concerns	how	well	it	corresponds	to	external	reality	(Jablensky,	2016).	In	terms	of	nosological	validity	this	has	been	taken	to	mean	that	a	diagnosis	should	describe	a	discrete	set	of	characteristics	that	cluster	together	because	they	arise	from	a	shared	underlying	neurobiological	atypicality	(Kendell	&	Jablensky,	2003).	
	How	does	the	diagnosis	of	autism	measure	up	against	these	criteria?	Autism	spectrum	disorder,	when	diagnosed	by	trained	clinicians	using	standardised	measures,	is	reliable	(Lord	et	al.,	2011).	Furthermore,	there	is	evidence	that	the	concept	of	autism	can	have	clinical	utility,	at	least	in	settings	where	resources	are	available	to	autistic	people.	This	is	because	an	autism	diagnosis	can	provide	a	shorthand	description	of	a	person’s	strengths	and	difficulties,	and	point	towards	potentially	beneficial	clinical,	educational	and	social	support	(Ruiz-Calzada	et	al.,	2012).	Further,	many	autistic	people,	especially	those	diagnosed	as	adults,	experience	their	diagnosis	as	a	‘not	guilty	verdict’	–	a	way	of	narrativising	their	lives	in	a	kinder,	less	blaming	way	than	would	occur	in	the	absence	of	a	diagnosis	(e.g.,	Punshon	et	al.,	2009).			Despite	its	reliability	and	utility,	there	continue	to	be	doubts	raised	about	the	value	of	autism	as	a	diagnosis.	These	centre	on	the	question	of	its	validity.	The	first	major	problem	is	that	the	diagnosis	is	very	heterogeneous,	encompassing	a	wide	range	of	individuals	whose	autistic	symptoms	arise	from	multiple	different	underlying	causes.		There	is	not	a	single	autism,	but	rather	there	are	hundreds,	or	even	thousands,	of		‘autisms’	(Jeste	&	Gerschwind,	2014).	This	means	that	researchers	seeking	to	understand	autism	are	faced	with	an	impossible	task.	They	assemble	a	sample	of	people	who	meet	official	(DSM-5)	criteria	for	autism	spectrum	disorder;	and	within	this	sample	are	diverse	individuals	whose	conditions	have	various	underlying	mechanisms,	who	have	diverse	needs,	and	who	will	benefit	from	different	interventions.	Researchers	have	long	been	aware	of	how	this	problem	has	hampered	the	progress	of	autism	genetics,	and	it	
certainly	impacts	upon	most	other	areas	of	autism	research	too	(Abrahams	&	Geschwind,	2008).			A	second	problem	with	the	current	diagnostic	conceptualisation	is	that	it	treats	autism	as	a	discrete	condition,	where	as	in	reality	it	is	part	of	a	wider	spectrum	of	neurodevelopmental	atypicality.	This	is	shown	by	the	fact	that	characteristic	autistic	symptoms	almost	never	occur	in	isolation,	but	comprise	part	of	a	constellation	of	co-existing	features,	including	behaviours	that	get	labelled	as	attention	deficit/hyperactivity	disorder	(ADHD),	developmental	coordination	disorder	(DCD),	oppositional	defiant	disorder,	anxiety	conditions,	and	tic	disorders,	among	others	(e.g.,	Gillberg	et	al.,	2010).	To	describe	an	independent,	circumscribed	condition	such	as	autism,	as	representing	a	category	which	is	distinct	from	ADHD,	DCD	and	other	conditions,	is	to	fail	to	describe	the	nature	of	human	neurodevelopment	as	it	really	is.			These	limitations	to	the	scientific	validity	of	the	autism	diagnosis	matter.	They	constrain	our	ability	to	find	the	mechanisms	that	underlie	autistic	characteristics	and	experience,	and	therefore	impede	the	development	of	effective	interventions	to	support	autistic	people	and	their	families.		This	validity	problem	is	not	limited	to	autism:	in	fact,	it	applies	to	almost	all	the	diagnoses	in	DSM-5.	Recently,	the	National	Institute	of	Mental	Health	(NIMH),	which	is	the	world’s	largest	funder	of	mental	health	research,	attempted	to	address	the	situation,	by	introducing	an	alternative	way	of	classifying	mental	health	conditions,	which	they	call	Research	Domain	Criteria	(RDoC).	The	idea	
was	to	introduce	a	parallel	classification	system	to	DSM-5,	which	describes	validated	dimensions	of	functioning	relevant	to	mental	health	that	can	be	linked	to	underlying	biological	systems	(Insel	et	al.,	2010).	The	aim	is	to	give	researchers	a	descriptive	framework	that	more	closely	reflects	the	true	nature	of	how	the	brain	gives	rise	to	experience	and	to	behaviour.		Some	have	heralded	the	RDoC	as	providing	a	new	dawn	for	the	study	of	psychopathology	(e.g.,	Cuthbert,	2014).	What	is	their	relevance	to	autism?	RDoC	have	not	yet	been	widely	adopted	in	autism	research.	It	is	now	10	years	since	they	were	first	vaunted,	yet	a	PubMed	search	of	the	terms	‘RDoC’	and	‘autism’,	(conducted	in	May	2018)	returned	only	18	papers,	of	which	5	contained	original	data.	My	view	is	that	in	their	current	form,	the	RDoC	are	of	only	limited	use	to	autism	researchers.	Whilst	they	map	autism-relevant	social	and	communication	difficulties,	their	relevance	to	other	central	elements	of	autism	is	less	clear.	For	example,	the	current	RDoC	framework	contains	very	little	concerning	the	atypical	sensory	processing	that	is	so	central	to	autistic	experience.		Nevertheless,	the	RDoCs	do	have	potential	value	to	autism	research.	First,	the	RDoCs	are	not	intended	to	replace	DSM-5,	but	rather	are	designed	to	provide	a	parallel,	more	scientifically-productive	way	of	conceptualising	and	studying	the	sorts	of	conditions	described	in	DSM-5.	The	advantage	of	this	is	that	adopting	RDoC’s	does	not	mean	having	to	abandon	the	clinically	useful	construct	of	autism,	which	is	central	to	the	lives	and	identities	of	millions.	Second,	the	architects	of	the	RDoCs	were	clear	that	their	current	framework	is	not	comprehensive,	and	indeed	is	designed	to	be	extended	and	embellished.	So	there	
is	nothing	to	stop	autism	researchers	from	adding	their	own	RDoC	candidates,	and	investigating	these.	Third,	the	RDoCs	are	intended	as	a	trans-diagnostic	framework,	and	so	can	account	for	the	fact	that	autism	is	part	of	a	wider	spectrum	of	neurodevelopmental	atypicality.	It	will	be	productive	to	investigate	RDoC	dimensions	that	cross	our	current	diagnostic	boundaries,	for	example	in	samples	that	include	individuals	with	ADHD	and	autism,	as	well	as	those	with	sub-clinical	traits	of	these	conditions.	Such	a	trans-diagnostic	and	dimensional	RDoC	approach	has	already	been	adopted	in	other	areas,	for	example	in	a	study	that	investigated	the	neural	basis	of	reward	processing	in	schizophrenia	and	depression	(Arrondo	et	al.,	2015).		Finally,	I	argue	that	RDoCs	can	help	resolve	a	fundamental	disagreement	that	is	at	the	heart	of	contemporary	autism	culture,	on	the	question	of	whether	it	is	ever	acceptable	to	look	for	a	‘cure’	for	autism.	Until	recently,	many	autism	researchers	assumed	it	was	their	job	was	to	seek	a	cure	for	autism.	The	prevention	and	cure	of	autism	continues	to	be,	for	some,	a	legitimate	goal	of	autism	research.	Yet	this	idea	is	offensive	to	many	autistic	people,	who	see	such	a	stance	as	the	sinister	imposition	of	normative	values	on	a	disempowered,	atypical	minority,	akin	to	historical	efforts	to	‘cure’	gay	people	of	their	homosexuality	using	psychotherapy.	The	RDoC	provide	a	way	to	navigate	this	treacherous	terrain.	This	is	because	they	do	not	seek	to	treat	autism	at	a	single	entity,	but	rather	understand	the	experiences	of	autistic	people	as	arising	from	the	action	of	multiple	systems.	Therefore	an	RDoC	approach	would	allow	us	to	attempt	to	address	some	aspects	of	autism,	but	not	others	(Foss-Feig	et	al.,	2016).	Within	this	framework,	researchers	could	focus	efforts	on	developing	interventions	for	
elements	of	autistic	experience	that	are	widely	agreed	to	be	aversive,	such	as	sleep	problems	and	high	rates	of	anxiety,	without	an	overall	goal	of	‘curing’	autism.	Crucially,	decisions	about	what	aspects	of	autistic	experience	to	focus	on	should	be	decided	based	on	debates	that	prioritise	the	views	of	autistic	people,	as	well	as	parents,	scientists	and	clinicians.			In	this	way,	RDoC	can	provide	a	framework	for	understanding	atypical	neurodevelopment	in	a	way	that	combines	scientific	rigour	and	genuine	respect	for	the	experiences	and	views	of	autistic	people.	Such	an	endeavour	could	hasten	progress	towards	there	being	an	evidence	base	for	helping	neurodiverse	people	live	more	satisfying	lives.		Acknowledgements:	The	author	thanks	David	Skuse	for	his	insightful	comments	on	an	earlier	draft	of	this	editorial.		 	
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